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Introduction 
Teacher salaries account for 74% of the governmental recurrent expenses on 
education in 55 developing countries (Bruns, Mingat and Rakotomalala 
2003).Yet in many education production function studies, teacher salaries have 
the lowest marginal product per dollar spent among observable school inputs 
(Pritchett and Filmer 1999). Meanwhile, teacher salaries are high relative to 
GDP per capita. These suggest that teachers are overpaid in developing 
countries. Pritchett and Filmer (1999) conclude that school spending systems in 
developing countries are distorted towards teachers’ welfare, i.e. teachers 
receive rents due to political factors. Such rents should have attracted potential 
teachers to enter the teacher labor market. Yet, why class size is still so large in 
developing countries? Why many laborers with teacher training cannot be 
formally employed in schools? This paper offers an explanation based on 
several special features of the education production process. It argues that 
relatively high teacher salaries could be due to economic factors, e.g. the 
skill-matching mechanism in the teacher labor market, but not necessarily due to 
political factors in the school systems. 
Empirical Results: 
Table 2: Results of Testing H1 and H2 




Edu  0.052 (0.021)***  0.063 (0.008)*** 
Exp -0.030  (0.010)***  0.013  (0.004)*** 
Age 0.014  (0.010)  0.007  (0.004)* 
Female  0.391 (0.021)***  -0.069 0.021)*** 
PrimaryCert 0.100  (0.100)  0.527  (0.064)*** 
LowSecCert 0.144  (0.103)  0.616  (0.067)*** 
UpSecCert 0.136  (0.156)  0.531  (0.065)*** 
AvgEdu  0.159 (0.057)***  0.046 (0.022)** 
AvgExp -0.001 (0.006) 0.002 (0.002)
AvgFemale 0.752  (0.235)*** 0.214  (0.089)** 
AvgMarried 0.343 (0.237) -0.125 (0.089)
%PrimCert 0.058  (0.328)  0.263  (0.107)** 
%LowSecCert -0.121  (0.279)  0.207  (0.102)** 
%UpSecCert 1.190 (0.436)*** 0.301 (0.145)**
Sample Size  2541  2541 
(Pseudo)R
2 0.10 0.48
a. Migration: an ordered index of the extent of a teacher’s migration 
status. Column (1) is estimated using the ordered probit model.     
b: wage: monthly wage = basic + Bonus + Benefits + Subsidy + Other 
(RMB). Mean wage=938 RMB.   
c: County fixed effects and a set of non-teacher characteristic 
variables are controlled for (not reported). 
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Data: 
☼ Gansu Survey of Children and Families (wave II) conducted in 
2004. 
☼ Sampling: County->Township->Village->2000 Children & their 
younger siblings-> All schools they attend + nearby schools-> All 
teachers in these schools.   
☼ Teacher questionnaires collected information on individual 
teachers; principal questionnaires collected information on the overall 
characteristics of all teachers in the schools. 
Model 
 
☼ Technology: the O-Ring education production function; inputs are (imperfect) complements: early inputs (e.g., 
quality of primary teachers) are important to current achievement (e.g.,    test scores of secondary students; Table 1).   
Aj,k (t) = (qtk▪ q(t-1),k▪,…,▪ q1,k)▪B(zj,k,Qk)   (1) 
 
Aj,k (t): the achievement (test scores) of student j in school k measured at semester t. B(zj,k, Qk): maximum possible 
achievement of student j, given his or her characteristics (zjk) and non-teacher school quality (Qk). 0< qt,k <1: Teacher 
quality in semester t; the percentage of B(zj,k, Qk) achieved, other things being equal.   
 




   1
Min   w(q )
i  
                       ( 2 )  
s.t.  A  ≥ Ak 
 
w(q): the wage schedule given q. Ak: exogenous achievement target. 
 
☼ Equilibrium: Skill-Clustering. In any school k, teachers will be matched at the same quality level; the equilibrium 
quality level depends on the achievement target (Ak).  
 
☼ Implications:   
(1) Given the achievement target and the skill-clustering mechanism, schools will tend to hire teachers who are below 
average quality. Example: If q
2= qH▪q L= (q +a) ▪ (q-b), then a >b: q is closer to qL. High-skilled potential teachers may 
be over-qualified. 
(2) Given the skill-clustering mechanism, a high-skilled teacher will have the incentive to seek employment in a 
school with higher achievement target, and thus with high-skilled teachers (Hypothesis 1). 
(3) Given the skill-clustering mechanism, other teachers’ quality drives up an individual teacher’s wage (Figure 1; 
Hypothesis 2). 
N
i,k i,k k w(q ) (q )  
                       ( 3 )  
 
Θk: A composite measure of school characteristics.   
 
 
(4) Given the skill-clustering mechanism, achieving higher target is costly, as wage increases faster at higher quality 
level. 
 
                                              
 
☼ Empirical Framework: Extended Mincerian (1974) wage equation:   
N
i,k i,k j,k k
ji
ln [w(q )] =   ln(q ) ln(q ) +  ln( )

  






: A measure of overall teacher quality of all other teachers in school k. 
Proxies for q: education, experience, teaching certification, etc. 
Table 1: Student Achievement and Teacher Quality: O-Ring Production 








Japan 579  557  522    East  Asia   
96 
 
71  South Korea  587  547  525 





77  Chile 392  384  410 
Mexico -- 387  422 
South Africa  275  --  --    Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
69 78 
Sources: IAEEA (2000, 2003) 
Conclusions: 
☼ Theoretically, schools’ cost minimization behavior could lead to 
high teacher salaries, even when there is no political factor that 
creates rents for teachers.   
☼ Empirically, there is evidence of the skill-clustering mechanism in 
the teacher labor market in rural China: 
(1) A high-skilled teacher is more likely to be a migrant. At the same 
time schools with high-skilled teachers are more likely to attract 
migratory teachers (H1). 
(2) An individual teacher’s wage is higher if he or she works with 








Figure 1: wage schedule for teachers